Referring to the recent debate between Stavros Tsakyrakis and Madhav
Introduction
The International Journal of Constitutional Law has recently staged an exciting debate on the merits and detriments of proportionality.
1 Stavros Tsakyrakis attempted to unmask proportionality as "an assault on human rights," 2 while Madhav Khosla maintained that Tsakyrakis failed to demonstrate any defect in the proportionality test. 3 This debate is to be seen against the background of the dramatic spread of proportionality across the globe which we have witnessed in the past two decades.
4 Proportionality * Professor of Public Law, EU Law, Public International Law and Jurisprudence, University of Hamburg. Email: jpklatt@jura.uni-hamburg.de . ** PhD, Faculty of Law, University of Hamburg. Email: moritz.meister@web.de . 1 any more, and where "everything" was up for grabs. 15 In his opinion, rights should rather be treated as "trumps" than as mere "private interests." 16 This criticism is partly correct. If fundamental rights were mere interests, the proportionality test would be applied as follows: Since the legitimate aim was any lawful aim, any interest could legitimately be pursued by a state ' s measure infringing a fundamental right. A wide range of aims would be allowed to play out as competing interests on the balancing stage. Rights and all public interests would compete on the same level. 17 Having a right thus would not mean having priority over competing considerations. 18 Constitutional rights of constitutional status could be outweighed even by minor interests without constitutional status. Fundamental rights would be deprived of their normative power.
Another possibility is to notion rights as "trumps," 19 "side constraints," 20 or as a "fi rewall." 21 This idea of trumping is based on a "priority to rights" 22 conception, a basic liberal intuition that rights enjoy some kind of special priority, which gives them lexical priority over other considerations. 23 Tsakyrakis prefers this understanding when he says that "by defi nition, any treaty for the protection of human rights gives priority to rights." 24 However, he does not present any particulars as to how rights can trump other considerations. He simply argues that a concept of rights as trumps was incompatible with balancing: in . . . balancing, there cannot be any concept of fundamental rights having priority over other considerations. 25 This view is similar to Beatty ' s argument that, in proportionality, rights "have no special force as trumps," but are "just rhetorical fl ourish." 26 Likewise, da Silva argues that trumping is defi ned by the complete absence of balancing. 27 These authors understand the concept of a "trump card" as a categorical concept, rather than a classifying concept: It defeats other cards irrespective of their weight. 15 Id . at 489. For similar critique see G R É GOIRE C. N. W EBBER , T HE N EGOTIABLE C ONSITUTION 101 (2009 Contrary to these assumptions, we will show that trumping and balancing can be combined in a concept of "soft trumping." 28 The idea of "soft trumping" presumes that rights can be given priority over other considerations according to their weight without assigning them a categorical priority.
Trumping and balancing combined
Both the proportionality test and balancing can incorporate the idea of trumping rights by means of two elements. The fi rst element requires defi ning the legitimate aim a measure pursues. At this stage, the class of aims that are allowed to count as "legitimate" must be defi ned. Rights as constitutional values can only be overruled by other constitutional values. 29 This assumption leads to the fi rst element of combining proportionality and trumping: Constitutional rights always trump any consideration except for considerations which enjoy constitutional status also. Only suffi ciently important, i.e. constitutional values are considered as legitimate aims. It follows that only interests of constitutional value are allowed to play out on the balancing stage.
The second element refers to the balancing stage. Here it is possible to assign higher abstract weights to rights than to other considerations. In balancing, it is determined whether the importance of the aim pursued justifi es the seriousness of the infringement with the right. The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of the right, the more important the competing interests must be. 30 Within this balancing exercise, the abstract weights of the colliding considerations play an important role. The abstract weight is the weight that a principle possesses relative to other principles, but independently of the circumstances of any concrete case. A constitution may well assign different abstract weights to its principles. It may, for example, assign the right to human dignity or the right to life a higher abstract weight than the right to property. One can assign higher abstract weights to rights than to other considerations. Alternatively, one can assign different abstract weights to different rights. Differences in abstract weights bring about a sort of trumping effect. The trumping effect of the abstract weight can be strengthened indefi nitely. This relation can be expressed in the following Law of Trumping : The higher the abstract weight of a right, the more likely it will trump competing considerations. Assigning high abstract weights to rights is thus a proper way to combine proportionality and trumping.
To be sure, this trumping by assigning abstract weights does not determine the outcome of balancing. Contrary to Rawls ' s account, 31 the rights with a high abstract weight do not categorically trump colliding considerations with lower abstract weights. This is true because the abstract weights of the colliding considerations are just one of various variables in balancing. However, they establish a winning margin for fundamental rights. In other words: Abstract weights establish a "prima facie trumping," not a "defi nite trumping. We conclude that proportionality and trumping are compatible by means of two conditions: fi rst, by requiring that the legitimate aim is of constitutional status; and, second, by assigning higher abstract weights to rights than to other considerations. Tsakyrakis ' s and da Silva ' s assumption that balancing and trumping were incompatible is thus incorrect.
Effective protection
The main aim of the rights-as-trumps model is guaranteeing effective protection. In our model, combining trumping and proportionality, we state that fundamental rights do not always trump any colliding consideration. Nevertheless, the combination of proportionality and trumping is capable of guaranteeing effective protection by means of three fi rewalls.
Firstly, as outlined above, only legitimate aims of constitutional status are considered to be able to compete with the right on the balancing stage. Minor interests fail to pass the initial legitimate aim test. Rights are given strict priority over every other consideration except for considerations of constitutional status.
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Secondly, at the balancing stage, the importance of fundamental rights is taken into account by assigning important rights high abstract weights enabling them to prevail over other considerations. The higher the abstract weight of the fundamental right, the more likely it trumps colliding considerations.
Thirdly, not "everything . . . is . . . up for grabs" 33 in our combined model. The rights ' protection cannot be nullifi ed completely. A center of resistance, a core content of the right, has to be left. Tsakyrakis ' s argument 34 that the idea of inviolable core content was incompatible with the idea of balancing rights against competing public interests is mistaken.
The essential core of a right "is what is left over after the balancing test has been carried out." 35 Limitations that pass the proportionality test do not infringe the core, "even if they leave nothing left of the constitutional right in an individual case." 36 However, an absolute minimum of protection can be guaranteed within the balancing model. Constitutional rights "gain overproportionally in strength as the intensity of interferences increases." 37 Very serious interferences can hardly ever be justifi ed by raising the weight of the justifying reasons. The trade-off of one principle becomes increasingly diffi cult to justify as the trade-off of the other principle becomes greater.
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As the satisfaction of a constitutional right diminishes, so even greater gains for the 32 Cf . Borowski, supra note 9, at 213 n.71. 33 Tsakyrakis, Proportionality , supra note 1, at 489. justifying principle are necessary to balance any further loss of the rights, and vice versa. This means that something like a "center of resistance" exists which functions as a "fi re wall" protecting minimum core contents of rights. Under certain conditions, it is reliable to a very high degree that no countervailing principle will take priority over the right. These conditions, then, defi ne the essential core of that right. 39 The idea of essential core content is thus compatible with balancing. Taken together, these three fi rewalls ensure that even though rights do not trump all other considerations, they nonetheless provide effective protection.
The moral infection of proportionality
Tsakyrakis argues that proportionality was "a specifi c judicial test that pretends to balance values while avoiding any moral reasoning"; it "pretends to be objective, neutral, and totally extraneous to any moral reasoning." 40 Webber has argued that proportionality would depoliticize rights by purporting to turn the moral and political evaluations involved in delimiting a right into technical questions of weight and balance. Yet, the attempt to evade the political and moral questions inherent in the process of rights reasoning is futile. 41 We can call this the argument from the moral infection of balancing. There are two claims here: First, that balancing inevitably entails moral reasoning; second, that it pretends to be morally neutral. While the fi rst claim is true, the second is false. 42 It is true that balancing cannot do without moral reasoning. Only a very naïve approach would arrive at the conclusion that any legal reasoning could be valuefree and deprived of any moral considerations. 43 Tsakyrakis is quite right in stating that balancing can only yield correct outcomes if it refl ects its underlying moral concepts. 44 However, it is not true that the theory of balancing tends to disguise the moral foundations of the proportionality test. This may be true of some judicial reasoning in practice which does not meet up with the theory. 45 The theory of balancing has acknowledged its moral basis for a very long time. Moral reasoning is a necessary component of all constitutional rights adjudication. 46 We would like to demonstrate this with the help of the special case thesis and the distinction between internal and external justifi cation.
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A LEXY , supra note 29, at 195. 40 Tsakyrakis, Proportionality , supra note 1, at 474. See also id . at 475: "tends to neglect any moral reasoning", "risks neglecting the complexity of moral evaluation"; Tsakyrakis, A Rejoinder , supra note 1, at 308 (2010): "reducing human rights adjudication to questions of relative weight in order to bypass the moral discourse on values and priorities." Cf . da Silva, supra note 27, at 288. As an example for an overly simplistic view, he refers to B EATTY , supra note 7, at 160, 166, 169. 44 Tsakyrakis, Proportionality , supra note 1, at 491. 45 Tsakyrakis refers to two practical examples; see id . at 491-492. 
The special case thesis
The special case thesis was developed for legal argumentation qua syllogism, but it is likewise applicable to legal argumentation qua balancing. 47 It holds that legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse. 48 This thesis suggests two points. 49 First, legal discourse is a case of general practical discourse for it is concerned with practical questions like turning on the obligatory, the prohibited, and the permitted. Second, legal discourse is a special case. For it does not attempt to answer these practical questions in an absolute or general sense, but rather within the framework of a specifi c legal system. The legal framework imposes restrictions on practical discourse by means of binding norms, precedents, and doctrines from legal dogmatics.
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Legal discourse, then, is a special case because, contrary to general practical discourse, it has an institutional and authoritative character. What matters here is that due to the fi rst point, balancing is an instance of moral reasoning. It is therefore not true that, as Tsakyrakis assumes, moral reasoning was lost in balancing. 51 Afonso da Silva has made this point very clear: [Tsakyrakis] completely ignores that, just as almost everything in legal reasoning, the defi nition of degrees of satisfaction and non-satisfaction of a principle will always be subject to fi erce disputes, which will involve all types of arguments that may be used in legal argumentation in general, including the moral considerations he misses so much. 
Internal and external justifi cation
The distinction between internal and external justifi cation is concerned with the relation of balancing and reasoning. 53 Again, this distinction has been developed in 47 On the differences between subsumption and balancing, The fact that it does not matter here whether the restrictions stem form precedent or statutory law suggest that the account presented here is applicable to both civil and common law. 51 Tsakyrakis, Proportionality , supra note 1, at 488. Internal justifi cation regards the question whether the balancing result can be deduced from the premises following the rules of arithmetic. The question of internal justifi cation can be answered by looking to the formal structure of balancing as described by the Weight Formula. 55 As soon as the values to be assigned to the variables are determined, the result can be deduced by following the rules of arithmetic. As it is with the internal justifi cation by means of the legal syllogism, which does not follow arithmetic, but logical rules, 56 it is entirely a matter of formal structure. Neither legal syllogism nor the Weight Formula is concerned with the truth or correctness of the premises. Both are merely involved with the inferential relation of deducing a result from the premises. In contrast, external justifi cation has the truth of premises as its object. It is concerned with giving reasons for the values inserted in the Weight Formula; it is, for instance, involved with the justifi cation of evaluating the intensity of an interference to be "serious" or the weight of a competing principle to be "light."
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It is precisely the external justifi cation where moral reasoning comes into balancing. Since balancing is dependent upon the evaluation of intensities and weights, it is clear that balancing must entail moral considerations. Courts cannot dispense with their responsibility to justify their decisions both internally and externally, and, hence, with engaging in the intricate moral complexities of the cases before them. The two voices cited by Tsakyrakis are mistaken in this point. 
Balancing and moral considerations
It is the very use of balancing analysis to help identifying the elements of the judicial reasoning which follow formally from given premises, and those elements which have to be externally justifi ed. Thus, balancing does not at all "obscure the moral considerations that are at the heart of human rights issues." 59 On the contrary, it clearly lays open the moral discourse indispensable in balancing, and shows us which propositions exactly a Court has to justify in order to arrive at a rational judgment. 60 Here, we can concur with the last sentence in Tsakyrakis ' s rejoinder, stating that the reasoning of a court is clearer "the more explicit the moral considerations of a case are made."
61 Balancing helps to fulfi ll that task and facilitates more rationality in human 
. 55 Alexy, The Weight Formula , supra note 53. 56 Alexy, On Balancing and Subsumption , supra note 47.
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The criticism of Alexy ' s approach to the analysis of the concept of "proportionality" is usually based on this limitation. See Webber, supra note 10, at 184-186 (2010). Mattias Kumm has looked closely into this and argued that
[t]he metaphor of "balancing" should not obscure the fact that the last prong of the proportionality test will in many cases require the decision-maker to engage in theoretically informed practical reasoning, and not just in intuition-based classifi catory labeling. At the level of evaluating the relative importance of the general interest in relation to the liberty interest at stake, the weights can be assigned and priorities established as required by the correct substantive theory of justice.
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In his reply to Kumm, Alexy has also stressed this point and argued that proportionality, although being a central feature of rights reasoning, were in need of supplementation by considerations from substantial political morality. 64 Alexy agreed with Kumm and stressed that
[p]roportionality analysis is, as the weight formula shows, a formal structure that essentially depends on premises provided from outside.
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All in all, these considerations allow us to see clearly what proportionality ' s claim to neutrality means: It is as neutral as possible as far as its formal structure is concerned. As such, it is "a universal criterion of constitutionality."
66 But this formal structure must be fi lled with moral arguments and considerations of weight and value that vary according to different perspective: "Proportionalities vary directly with the weight and values people place on the relevant interests." 
Incommensurability
Tsakyrakis argues that the metaphor of balancing "says nothing about how various interests are to be weighted, and this silence tends to conceal the impossibility of measuring incommensurable values."
68 To him, the argument from incommensurability is frequently considered to constitute "the most effective critique of balancing."
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This argument was not taken up by Khosla in his reply. 70 It is nonetheless important since several scholars contest the assumption of a common metric as a basis for balancing. 71 The argument comes in two variants: The fi rst points to the fact that "our The second challenges the assumption that interests are "ultimately reducible to some shared metric" and that, "once translated into this common standard, they can be measured against each other." 73 While the fi rst variant of the argument refers to single principles alone, the second relies on the relation between at least two principles. 
Lacking quantifi ability
The fi rst objection is certainly true in pointing to the fact that principles are amenable to quantifi cation to varying degrees. All rights that are linked to the monetary dimension, e.g. the right of property, are much more suitable for quantifi cation than rights that lack this dimension. However, balancing does not depend upon assigning an exact, mathematical quantifi cation to the colliding principles. Rather, it works fi ne as long as it is possible to assign weights to them with the help of the triadic scale "light, moderate, and serious." It is suffi cient to rank the colliding principles ordinally, rather than cardinally.
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Contrary to Tsakyrakis, we hold that many principles used in moral and legal reasoning are, indeed, amenable to this triadic scale, despite their lacking amenability to mathematical quantifi cation. To put it more clearly: Their lacking amenability to quantifi cation is not an argument against balancing those principles, but is the very reason for applying a scale to them. It is precisely the hard cases which are counting in favor of the model. 76 Clearly, the assignment of any weight in a given case may be disputed. But this is a matter of the external justifi cation of balancing and does not count against the use of the triadic scale as such. At this point, we can see clearly that the fi rst objection boils down to Habermas ' s objection of irrationality. At bottom, it denies the possibility of making rational propositions on weights and values. Thus, the fi rst variant of the objection is not exactly a discrete argument. The use of the triadic scale would only be irrational if it were impossible to decide upon the weight-assignments on rational grounds. To assume this impossibility, however, is not convincing. It would amount to denying any possibility of rational moral and legal reasoning, and, thus, not only to a far-reaching skepticism, but also to giving up the idea of constitutional law scholarship as a rational enterprise. what he means by referring to a "right ' s distinctive meaning." From the context of his argument, however, it becomes clear that he refers to the ability of rights to function as shields or trumps against certain reasons. This ability is independent of the problem of quantifi cation. This point, therefore, does not concern the argument from incommensurability per se, and has already been discussed above. 79 Tsakyrakis argues further that the use of scales would tend to privilege certain considerations which are more amenable to quantifi cations over those which are not, and to "assign them a role in the reasoning process that they would otherwise lack." 80 It is unclear what "otherwise" means: If a certain principle is relevant from the standpoint of the constitution, it has to be included in the balancing process. It cannot be left unconsidered. And if it was included, it would have exactly the role which follows from the weight assigned to it. This role is not to be changed unless by reasons justifying assigning a different weight.
The core of this objection, then, seems to be the fear that quantifi able considerations could be privileged over non-quantifi able considerations. This danger, however, does not exist. Once two principles are compared on a common scale, there is no room for privileging one over the other for the reason of different amenability to quantifi cation. The assignment of a light, moderate, or serious weight to a principle has to be justifi ed externally. To be sure, the external justifi cation can be debated, and this happens frequently. But this aspect is not suffi cient to demonstrate any differences between quantifi able and non-quantifi able principles, provided that they are measured on the same scale and, thus, from a common point of view.
Lacking common scale
Balancing, Tsakyrakis argues, conceals "the impossibility of measuring incommensurable values by introducing the image of a . . . common metric."
81 Since a common metric was not existent, a comparison of the respective weights was impossible. This second variant of the argument from incommensurability holds that, even if it were possible to assign values to all relevant principles per se, these values do not belong to a common scale.
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This argument is correct insofar as any comparison indeed presupposes a choice value common to the principles. 83 It is important to note, however, that Tsakyrakis does not claim incommensurability in the strong sense. Rather, he sides with Waldron ' s weak incommensurability. Weak incommensurability (at least in Tsakyrakis ' s understanding) acknowledges the lack of a common scale for balancing, but holds that it was possible to have rational grounds for preferring one principle over the other. 84 It is important to note that weak incommensurability does not argue that any preference order between principles was irrational. Rather, it argues that establishing preferences requires moral reasoning. We have already shown above that the assumption that balancing would pretend to be morally neutral is not correct. Balancing indeed provides for moral reasoning and, what is more, it demonstrates exactly at what stage and to what extent such reasoning is necessary in legal argument. 86 We can therefore agree with Tsakyrakis that establishing priorities between principles depends on moral argument. Tsakyrakis argues that "if the moral discourse is lacking, there is no way to demonstrate that values, indeed, are commensurable." 87 We agree with him here. But the opposite is also true: If the moral discourse is integrated (as it is in the concept of proportionality ' s external justifi cation), than there is no way to demonstrate that values were incommensurable. We can conclude, therefore, that proportionality allows for a common metric qua moral reasoning.
There is another point here. Although referring explicitly to Waldron, Tsakyrakis does not capture the most important feature of Waldron ' s weak incommensurability. In Waldron ' s defi nition, the dependence on moral reasoning is less important. Rather, Waldron refers to a "simple and straightforward priority rule." 88 According to Waldron ' s weak incommensurability, the ordering between principles is established by trumping, side constraints, or lexical priority, including weighing and balancing. Thus, contrary to strong incommensurability, Waldron ' s weak incommensurability affi rms the possibility of establishing an ordering of principles, but, unlike the usual account 89 of weak incommensurability, insists that the order must be established by means of balancing.
90
Afonso da Silva, drawing on recent development in the general theory of practical reason, 91 has lucidly demonstrated that neither strong nor weak incommensurability exclude balancing, since a distinction must be made between incommensurability and incomparability. 92 This distinction draws on the type of scale which is used in balancing. Balancing requires an ordinal ranking, securing comparability, and does not depend upon a cardinal ranking, which would guarantee commensurability.
93
The decisive point here is that incommensurability does not imply incomparability. Balancing works fi ne as long as comparability among the colliding principles is established, no matter whether they are incommensurable in the strong or the weak or, indeed, any other sense. Comparability can be established by means of 85 Id . at 474.
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See supra sections 3.2 and 3.3. 87 Tsakyrakis, Proportionality , supra note 1, at 474. 88 Waldron, supra note 23, at 816. 89 Usually, weak incommensurability is excluding any sort of balancing: see id . 90 Cf. id . at 821.
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Ruth Chang, Introduction , in I NCOMMENSURABILITY , supra note 75, at 1; Griffi n, supra note 75.
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Da Silva, supra note 27, at 282-283. 93 Cf . Chang, supra note 91, at 1. creating a common scale like Alexy ' s triadic scale which allows for comparing tradeoffs between the satisfaction viz. non-satisfaction of colliding principles. This is exactly the task that constitutional law and, indeed, practical reason in general leaves us with in hard cases. This is meant when Alexy argues that the constitution provides a common point of view and thereby indirectly establishes comparability. 94 In this sense, incommensurability is the starting point, rather the dead end, of balancing. This has lucidly been highlighted by Elijah Millgram: Commensurability is the result, rather than the precondition, of practical deliberation. 95 We conclude that incommensurability, be it strong or weak, does not hinder establishing rational preference relations among principle by means of balancing. 
Balancing as calculation
Tsakyrakis argues that balancing lacked a precision as found in natural sciences. It stuck to the "illusion of some kind mechanical weighing." 97 Balancing, according to Webber, purports that constitutional rights could be "transformed into management and mathematical measurement." 98 Afonso da Silva has argued that this objection was pointless since "the statement that mathematical precision is impossible in legal reasoning is a commonplace proposition that nobody denies" and, in particular, "defenders of balancing . . . do not claim any sort of mathematical precision."
The numbers in the weight formula are only a heuristic tool representing evaluations of, e.g., an infringement with a right as light, moderate, or serious. Thus, they help making explicit the internal structure of balancing, thus giving more rationality towards the whole process. 105 But the model works fi ne without any use of numbers. It does not claim any sort of mechanical, let alone mathematical character of the activity. Rather, it simply helps to understand what different steps balancing consists in. Another aspect that counts against the alleged over-precision is that balancing allows for discretion, both in the epistemic and in the structural dimension.
106

The problem of defi nitional generosity
Tsakyrakis argues that the balancing approach implied the "principle of defi nitional generosity."
107 According to this principle, the interpreter assumed a broad defi nition of the limitation clauses and thus of the legitimate aims that are allowed to limit a right. Since most limiting clauses allow rights to be restricted because of the rights of others, rights would be defi ned broadly. Therefore, these interests, once defi ned as legitimate aims, in turn played out on the balancing stage.
108 Insofar, the specifi cation of the items taken into account at the balancing stage was "insuffi ciently fi ne grained."
109 This critique leads to the question whether rights as limiting reasons should be defi ned rather narrowly or broadly.
The problem of defi nitional generosity concerns the question whether a third person has to be protected since she holds a right as well. The question if the limitation clause should be defi ned rather narrowly or broadly is thus identical with the question how the scope of fundamental rights should be defi ned.
There are four arguments why broad defi nitions are preferable. 110 Firstly, narrow defi nitions are only seemingly free of balancing. The outcome of a narrow interpretation of a fundamental right is always based on balancing, since it relies on reasons for and reasons against the protection. the right to freedom of expression can plausibly be defi ned as excluding the right to cause gratuitous insult to religious . . . sentiments, while the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion can plausibly be defi ned as limited to protection only from gratuitously insulting criticism.
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This defi nition, he continues, was "not an exercise in 'balancing ' as such."
114 If, however, the right to freedom of speech is defi ned by saying all speech but hate speech is protected, the outcome relies on balancing free speech against the prevailing rights of the person the speech addresses. 115 A broad defi nition of the right including hate speech at least prima facie recognizes that balancing is unavoidable. 116 Secondly, narrow defi nitions are structurally defi cient. They cause "major problems with regard to the structural and conceptual distinction between scope and justifi cation."
117 Since narrow defi nitions rely on hidden balancing, the rights ' content and the rights ' restrictions are mixed up. Both, however, must be treated separately, since they concern different logical procedures. The right ' s content is to be defi ned by interpreting the constitutional text. Competing interests are not to be taken into account at this stage. The competing interests come into play within the rights ' limitations, in particular in applying the proportionality test with balancing.
Thirdly, narrow defi nitions lead to legal uncertainty. Since narrow defi nitions rely on a hidden balancing, the scope of the right is not predictable. Broad defi nitions, in contrast, defi ne the rights ' scope without taking competing considerations into account. The prima facie protection is broad and thus predictable.
One might be inclined to object that, using broad defi nitions, while the very broad scope of a right was certain, still the outcome of the case was not, since it would depend on balancing the right with other rights and interests. This objection, however, neglects two important aspects. First, narrow defi nitions must, as well, rely on balancing; they only pretend to avoid it. How, after all, could one arrive at a specifi c narrow defi nition without using balancing for delineating the scope of the right? And if, on the other hand, this delineating is done indeed without considering colliding principles-how, then, could it claim to be rational? Second, the balancing account defended here is by no means an invitation to incorporate irrational and subjective means into rights reasoning. Rather, it entails structural, rational and logical rules 118 that limit the uncertainty of the outcome of a case in the best possible way.
Fourthly, the hidden balancing approach reduces the state ' s duty to justify rights ' restrictions. It empowers authorities to deny protection by arguing that a certain rights ' content does not protect the behavior in question, e.g. by treating limitations of rights as a specifi cation of the right ' s scope. 119 Protection can be denied without justifying this. Broad defi nitions, in contrast, lead to a broad prima facie protection, 120 and thus to the duty to justify for infringements at the justifi cation stage. 121 This avoids "black holes" of non-protection. 122 The state faces a duty to give reasons for not protecting rights only if certain behavior is protected prima facie.
Case analysis
Both Tsakyrakis and Khosla frequently refer to Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria .
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In this last part we will analyze this case, too, in order to exemplify our arguments presented above.
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In this case, a non-profi t organization called "Otto-Preminger-Institut," which was operating an art cinema in Innsbruck, Austria, announced six public showings of the fi lm "Das Liebeskonzil." The fi lm portrayed God the father, Jesus Christ, and the Virgin Mary in a critical way. They team up with the devil to punish mankind with syphilis. The Austrian authorities seized and confi scated the fi lm due to the domestic penal law. The applicant association complained about a violation of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression . . . . (2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such . . . restrictions . . . as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, . . . for the protection of the reputation of rights of others . . . .
Since there was no doubt that the seizure and forfeiture of the fi lm were interfering with the applicant ' s right to freedom of expression, and since the measures were prescribed by domestic law, we focus on the question whether the infringements were justifi ed under article 10(2) ECHR since they pursued a legitimate aim and were necessary in a democratic society. Prior to this, we will present the reasoning of the court.
The judgement
The court fi rst of all determined whether the seizure and forfeiture were aimed to protect a legitimate aim under article 10(2) ECHR, particularly the right to respect for one ' s religious feelings. 125 The majority of six judges stated that the measures aimed to protect the religious feelings of the population guaranteed under article 9 ECHR and thus a legitimate aim. 126 It argued that article 9 ECHR indeed didn ' t protect believers from all criticism, 127 but that "extreme cases" of critique engaged "the responsibility of the State" to protect the religious feelings. 128 And in the present case, the religious feelings could "legitimately be thought to have been violated by provocative portrayals of objects of religious veneration."
129 A minority of three judges, however, argued that a right to have one ' s religious feelings protected could not be derived from article 9 ECHR, since article 9 ECHR rather included a right to express views critical of the belief of others. 130 Nevertheless, the measure could be justifi ed to secure the "democratic character of a society" from "violent and abusive attacks on the reputation of religious groups." 131 The court then turned to the question whether the measures were necessary in a democratic society. The majority ruled that the seizure and forfeiture were "necessary to protect public order against the fi lm," since the fi lm was an attack on religion.
132 It argued that the precautions taken by the cinema-fi ve of six showings should take place at 10 p.m., an information bulletin informed about the contents of the fi lm, persons less than seventeen years of age were excluded, the targeted audience was art-interested and had to pay an entrance fee-were not suffi cient to prevent unwarranted offence, since the fi lm was "widely advertised" and there was "suffi cient public knowledge" of the fi lm. 133 Finally, the majority engaged in "weighing up the confl icting interests." 134 Here, the majority argued that the margin of appreciation left to the national authorities had not been overstepped since the Austrian authorities have had "due regard to the freedom of artistic expression."
135 Therefore, the majority concluded, article 10 ECHR had not been violated.
A minority of three judges, however, disagreed. They argued that the cinema had taken suffi cient precautions to give religiously sensitive people the opportunity to stay away from the fi lm. 136 The cinema thus limited the offence to others as far as it could reasonably be expected. 137 Therefore, "on balance," the minority concluded that the measures were "not appropriate." 138 We now want to determine how the case would have been solved by applying the proportionality test properly.
We therefore conclude that, due to the advantages of broad defi nitions as spelled out above, 147 the majority was correct in confi rming that religious feelings are protected by article 9 ECHR.
question. The majority engaged in "weighing up the confl icting interests," 151 and the minority argued that "on balance" the measures were not appropriate. 152 But in effect, both failed to balance properly.
The majority, on the one hand, simply concluded that the measures were proportionate since the Austrian authorities had not overstepped their margin of appreciation. 153 The margin of appreciation is thus used as an argument in order to forgo any substantiated balancing. In the end, as Khosla has it, it is "this doctrine, rather than proportionality, that has created the outcome." 154 It is vital to note that this contradicts the court ' s statement that "the supervision must be strict" in the present case. 155 The minority, on the other hand, mixed up the necessity test and the test of proportionality in the narrow sense. It stated that the seizure and forfeiture must be "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued," that actions were generally not proportionate if a "less restrictive solution" was available and that, since a less restrictive measure was available in the present case, the seizure and forfeiture were "not appropriate." 156 We can conclude that neither the majority nor the minority of the judges balanced properly. Tsakyrakis is right: there was a "dearth of argument" at the balancing stage. 157 But Tsakyrakis is not right to conclude that, therefore, "the balancing approach fails, spectacularly, to deliver what it promises." 158 Rather, Khosla is right in arguing that "it seems strange to suggest problems with proportionality by studying cases where it was poorly applied." 159 So let ' s have a look at how the case should have been decided if balancing would have been applied properly. This requires determining whether the importance of pursuing the legitimate aim can justify the seriousness of the infringement of the applicant ' s right. 160 First of all, it is important to be aware of the fact that the abstract weights of the confl icting rights can be neglected in the present case, since both rights are equally important from an abstract point of view, i.e. irrespective of any concrete cases. 161 Thus, we can start to determine how intense the infringement with the applicant ' s right was. For this task it is necessary to engage in an external justifi cation which inevitably includes moral reasoning. 162 In the present case, the Austrian authorities
